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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sawayas repeatedly emphasize their claim that the equipment
was "old and dilapidated.11
11, 13 n. 2, 15.)

(Sawayas' brief at 6, 8, 10; see

also

This improper attempt to prejudice the Court

should not be rewarded.

Of course the equipment was used, some of

it for 18 years, but all of the equipment valued by Mr. Steenblik
was still being used by Sawayas7 tenant. (Tr. 32, 73.)

In fact,

the equipment had been in use by Sawayas' tenant for nearly two
years at the time of valuation by Steenblik. (Tr. 74-75.)

This

conclusively shows that the equipment was not as "old and dilapidated" as Sawayas would have this Court believe.

Whatever the

condition of the equipment, that condition was already factored
into the appraisal made by Mr. Steenblik.
Some of the equipment, such as the fryer, was almost new. The
fryer had been purchased at a cost of $10,000.00 only six months

before Lysenko was forced to close his restaurant. (Tr. 92, 12728.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
LYSENKO PRESENTED SUFFICIENT AND COMPELLING
EVIDENCE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AT THE TRIAL.
A.

The Claim Of Unjust Enrichment Was Raised At Trial.

Sawayas assert

(at page 11 of their brief) that Lysenko's

unjust enrichment claim was raised for the first time several
months

after

trial.

The

record

is

simply

contrary

to

this

argument.
Lysenko acknowledges that the claim of unjust enrichment is
not specifically raised in his complaint. The issue was litigated,
however, and therefore was properly before the Court. J.J.N.P. Co.
v. State Division of Wildlife Resources, 655 P.2d 1133, 1139 (Utah
1982) .

To raise an issue at trial, a party must (1) timely bring

the issue to the attention of the trial court, (2) specifically
raise the issue to a level of consciousness before the trial court,
and

(3)

introduce

to

the

trial

court

supporting

relevant legal authority concerning the issue.

evidence

or

Hart v. Salt Lake

County Commission, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Ct. App.), cert, denied, 953
P.2d 449 (Utah 1997).
The claim of unjust enrichment was timely raised.

With the

first witness on the first day of trial, Lysenko offered

into

evidence a copy of the lease between Sawayas and HB Properties.
2

Sawayas objected to the evidence as irrelevant. Lysenko argued for
the admission of the evidence on the ground that it showed the
equipment "had value and he [Sawaya] was receiving money on it."
(Tr. 2 0.) Whether Sawaya was receiving money for the equipment was
relevant

only

to

a

claim

of

unjust

enrichment.

(Additional

evidence was presented on the unjust enrichment issue, as shown
below.)
The issue was raised to the level of consciousness before the
trial court.

In closing argument, Lysenko's counsel argued as

follows:
Mr. Slaugh: But he did have — I think
the Court has to look at the unjust enrichment
in determining the value. The case says the
measure of damages was the full value of the
property, and the full value is the value in
place.
The fact that it may not have been able
to sell on the open market for a whole lot of
money is not particularly important.
Mr.
Lysenko testified that he had a use for it.
What he's going to have to pay is what it's
going to cost to buy new equipment, since a
lot of this is not readily marketable.
Then again, I go back to policy issue.
The unjust enrichment of claim.
Mr. Sawaya
and Mrs. Sawaya have that much value. If the
Court rules otherwise, there's always going to
be an incentive.1 You know, if you have that
difference, you need to pay the full value.

deferring to the same argument as raised in Lysenko's initial
brief at p. 15: "A rule authorizing payment of only liquidation
value under these circumstances also creates a very improper
incentive: if a landlord knew it could obtain $35,185.00 worth of
equipment for only $10,980, by wrongfully preventing the owner from
taking possession, the choice would usually be in favor of
conversion."
3

The case of Brewerton versus Dixon is
somewhat analogous situation.
There was a
fruit grower out in I believe Edgemont that
had his crop burned up because of someone's
negligence. The grower who had — I mean, the
contractor who had started the fire tried to
argue that the measure of damages, the value
before and the value after, the land was worth
a whole lot less, and they tried to argue that
as a measure of value.
The Supreme Court held the measure of
value as the income stream that could have
been generated from that fruit that was on the
property. It shows that really you're looking
at what the value was to the person who had
that property.
(Tr. 255-56, emphasis added.)
Finally, Lysenko offered both evidence and argument on the
issue.

The arguments are set forth above.

The evidence included

the lease with HB Properties described above, and evidence that HB
Properties used the existing equipment and therefore saved at least
$60,000.00 in start-up expenses.
initial brief at p. 10.)

(Tr. 228-29, 250; see Lysenko's

Most notably, Lysenko presented evidence

through Reid Steenblik concerning the value of the equipment in
place, which was the benefit to Sawayas.
B.

Lysenko Established
Unjust Enrichment.

A Proper Measure Of Damages

Sawayas argue that there is no evidence delineating

For
what

percentage of the monthly rental paid by HB Properties to Sawayas
may be attributed to Lysenko's equipment.

(Sawayas' brief at 11.)

Lysenko had no duty to present such evidence.
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Such evidence would

have been one way to demonstrate the amount of benefit received by
Sawayas, but not the only way.

Where Sawayas retained possession

of property owned by Lysenko, the in-place value of that property
was a proper measure of damages.

Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co. , 713

P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1986) (unjust enrichment by installation of
sprinkler

system measured by value of the materials

installed

rather than the benefit conferred (increased value of the land));
Robertus v. Candee, 670 P. 2d 540, 542 (Mont. 1983) (measure of
damages is either the value of labor and materials or the value of
the enhancement to the property) (citing Restatement of the Law of
Contracts 2d § 371).

Where there are two potential measures of

damages, "and the plaintiff gives evidence only as to one, it is up
to the defendant to show that the other measure of damages would be
less."

Ault v. Dubois. 739 P.2d 1117, 1121 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

The evidence in this case conclusively showed that Sawayas had
leased Lysenko's equipment to HB Properties.

The evidence further

showed that HB Properties saved at least $60,000.00 in start-up
costs by using Lysenko / s equipment.

The conclusion is inescapable

that Sawayas benefitted from the use of Lysenko's equipment.

The

best measure of that benefit was the value of the equipment itself,
in place and as used by Sawayas.

The trial court erred in not

accepting that measure of damages.
POINT II
LYSENKO DID NOT WAIVE HIS CLAIM TO POSSESSION
OF THE EQUIPMENT.

5

Count II of plaintiff's complaint alleged:

"Plaintiff is

entitled to an Order declaring that plaintiff is the owner of each
of the items of personal property and permitting plaintiff to take
possession of such property."
the

complaint

sought

a

(R. 2.)

"declaration

The prayer for relief in
that

plaintiff

owns

the

personal property," which would include the incidents of ownership
including

the right of possession.

(R. 1.)

In his

opening

statement, Lysenko's counsel argued that Lysenko was "entitled to
either receive the equipment back—it's removable. We could go out
today and take it out—or he is entitled to the value of the
equipment."

(Tr. 6-7.)

Lysenko submitted a trial memorandum, the

first point of which argued that "Peter Lysenko now owns

[the

interest of Central Bank] and is entitled, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 70A-9-503, to take possession of the personal property."
(R. 274.)

In his testimony, Mr. Lysenko testified that he had a

use for the equipment and wanted the items returned to him.

(Tr.

102.)
In response to Sawayas' motion to dismiss at the close of
Lysenko's

evidence, Lysenko's

counsel

presented

the

arguments to reenforce Lysenko's claim for possession:
Mr. Slaugh: Okay, that gets to the final
point of this memo. In the Complaint we ask
for possession. That is one of the rights [ —
-] [T]hat's the way you enforce the security
interest.
The secured party has the right
under UCC [sic] 78-9-503 to go and take possession. We asked for the right to go in and
take possession.

6

following

Alternatively, if the Court doesn't allow
that, we would ask for the right to foreclose
it.
That's the same kind of thing; take
possession or sell it. Or we've asked for a
conversion remedy.
If they have taken the
property, which is the subject of the security
interest, we're entitled to the damages, the
loss of what that value was, which is the
value of the property.
Now, our real preference is to go in and
take possession, pursuant to the security
interest.
The property is still subject to
that security interest.
We've presented
evidence that the security interest was
perfected and —
(Tr. 164-65.)
Finally, in closing argument, Lysenko's counsel argued that
Sawayas needed to pay for the equipment or return it.

(Tr. 251.)

Counsel concluded closing arguments by reaffirming the request for
possession:
We simply request the Court either declare, as
was asked in our complaint, that Mr. Lysenko
owns that, and he is entitled to go out and
pick [it up]; or grants the value of it, based
on the in-use value, which is what it was
worth to Mr. Lysenko, and which is the value
that Mr. Sawaya gained from it.
(Tr. 257.)
Notwithstanding these repeated demands for possession, from
the initial complaint to the closing arguments at trial, Sawayas
now claim that Lysenko somehow waived the claim because his new
trial motion focused on a different issue and because he inadvertently omitted the issue from his docketing statement.
arguments should be rejected.
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These

Lysenko's

new

trial

motion

raised

an

issue

(measure

of

damages) on which Lysenko believed there was some potential for
changing the trial court's decision.

There is no requirement that

a party file a new trial motion before appealing, Duaan v. Jones.
724 P.2d 955, 956 (Utah 1986), and therefore the failure to raise
an issue in a new trial motion does not waive that issue.
Sawayas admit that the omission from the docketing statement
does not prevent Lysenko from raising the issue on appeal, Nelson
for Stuckman v. Salt Lake City. 919 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 1996), but
claim it shows that possession was an afterthought.

The actual

explanation for the omission is simple inadvertence of counsel.
Finally, Sawayas argue that "plaintiff was arguing primarily
for damages."
withstand

(Sawayas7

analysis.

brief at

Sawayas

do

15.)
not

This claim does
cite

to

any

not

statement

emphasizing a claim for damages; there are none—all the statements
on the subject emphasized the claim for possession.

A review of

the record and transcript reveals that the primary issue in the
case prior to trial was whether Lysenko had any rights in the
equipment.

The trial testimony of Douglas Hurren and of Curtis

Loosli was exclusively addressed at that issue as was much of the
testimony

of

Mitchell

Sawaya

and

Peter

Lysenko.

Beyond

es-

tablishing that he had rights in the equipment, there was nothing
more Lysenko needed to do to establish a right to possession.
issue was really
security

interest

quite simple:

if Central Bank had

in the equipment
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and

if Lysenko

The

a valid

owned

that

interest, he therefore had a right under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-503
to take possession of the equipment.

Lysenko presented all of

those arguments to the trial court.
It is true that Lysenko also presented evidence and arguments
concerning the alternative claim for damages.

The nature of that

evidence was such that it occupied a substantial portion of the
trial testimony and was the focus of much of the closing arguments.
The fact that the damage testimony took the greater time was a
function of complexity, however, not of emphasis or preference.
Sawayas challenge Lysenko's explanation that he wanted to use
the equipment in a new restaurant.

Sawayas label the testimony as

a "vague contemplation of the possibility of opening another
restaurant

someday."

(Sawayas' brief

inaccurate and unfair characterization.

at

16.)

This

is an

The fact is that Lysenko

owns the restaurant property and the restaurant building.
engaged in a diligent attempt to open the restaurant.

He is

The record

does not reflect this because the use Lysenko wanted to make of the
equipment is completely irrelevant.

He owns the equipment and is

entitled to possess it and use it for whatever purpose he chooses.
Sawayas also assert that "it was obvious from the nature of
some of the equipment that the Premises would have been damaged by
removing it." (Sawayas' brief at 15.) Sawayas cite no evidence to
support this claim and the evidence squarely contradicts it.

For

example, a lay person might think that removing a walk-in cooler/
freezer might damage the building.
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The expert testimony on the

subject, by Reid Steenblik, was that the cooler comes in parts and
could be removed without harm to the building. (Tr. 49.)
fans and hoods are regularly removed.

(Tr. 50, 56.)

Exhaust
Sawayas'

unsupported argument to the contrary should be summarily rejected.
CONCLUSION
In his complaint and at every appropriate opportunity during
the trial, Lysenko emphasized his preference for possession of the
personal property. There was never any waiver of that claim. This
case

should

be

remanded

with

instructions

to

grant

Lysenko

possession of the equipment.
Alternatively, the case should be remanded with instructions
to award Lysenko the in-place value of the property.

Sawayas have

benefitted from and leased the equipment in place, and it is simply
unfair to not require that they pay for that value in place.
DATED this

3Q^

day of June, 1998.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: f
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 3#th
day of June, 1998.
Stephen B. Mitchell, Esq.
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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